Public Private Partnerships and Infrastructure Finance: Policy and Recent Evidence

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- Introduction to the Center for Transportation Public-Private Partnership Policy
- Transportation Finance in the US
- Introduction to Public Private Partnerships (P3)
- The U.S. P3 Context
- Highlighted Center Research



**GEORGE ASON** VERSITY Public – Private Partnership Policy

## Center for Transportation Public-Private Partnership Policy

#### Mission

• To advance research, education and public service in the understanding of public-private partnership policy in the transportation sector

## Why is P3 research important?

- P3s offer an important alternative to traditional funding sources, creating opportunities and challenges
- Advancing public interest through P3s requires careful analysis by public decision-makers of costs, risks and rewards



# Center's Advisory Board

#### Brings together valuable industry stakeholders

- J. Douglas Koelemay Former Director, Virginia Office of Public-Private Partnership (VAP3)
- Peter J. "Jack" Basso Parsons Brinckerhoff and Peter J. Basso, LLP
- Geoffrey Yarema Partner, Nossaman, LLP
- Jennifer Aument Group General Manager North America, Transurban
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- Mathew Garver Chairman and CEO, Liberty Street Capital
- Belen Marcos
   President, Cintra US
- John Irvine North America Director, Business Development – The Lane Construction Corp.



## Center's Activities

## Hosts annual conference on P3s

# 3rd annual P3 Forum: *Evidence: P3s and the Evolution of Infrastructure Delivery*









## Center's Activities

- Support doctoral student research
- Peer reviewed journal articles
- Present work at academic & professional conferences
- Case studies on transportation P3 projects and programs
- White papers on topics such as best practices



## Center's Activities

Hays Outside the Box Competition



Outside the Box Competition

8

#### Poster Sessions at Conferences



#### **Professional Insights Session**



## Transportation Finance in the US



# Transportation Finance in the US

- Public and private mix of transportation services
- Ownership and Operation of Transportation by Mode
  - Roads / Highways: state and local governments, and private entities in some instances
  - Intercity passenger rail: public provision (Amtrak, a gov't corporation)
  - Urban transit: public provision (mostly city and local governments)
  - Freight rail: private provision (infrastructure and operation)
  - Air: airports have been publicly provided, while private firms operate flights
  - Sea: presence of private firms have been increasing
  - Ports: port authority model (city, county, state, interstate compact), mix of public & self financing



# Highway Funding -1

- User fees
  - Excise tax on gasoline : Highway Trust Fund
  - Federal 18.3 cents/gallon
  - Some states have their own gasoline taxes
  - Car registration fee (state)
  - Tolls (state / project)

#### Non-user fees

Sales tax, etc. (state)



## Highway Funding -2

- Debt-Financing: Bond by state and local governments
  - Tax-exempt municipal bonds
  - Various bond products (Private Activity Bond, GARVEE, ARRA, etc.)
- Debt-Financing: Loans for state and local governments
  - Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) Loan
  - State Infrastructure Bank Loans
  - Private Loans



## Traditional Highway Funding Model in Crisis

- Increasing costs of construction
  - (e.g. increased regulation)
- Increasing costs of maintenance
  - (e.g. increased standards)
- Improving fuel efficiencies
  - (e.g. electric vehicles do not pay gas tax)
- Political inability to raise gas tax
  - (e.g. Taxpayer Bill or Rights in Colorado, TABOR)



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## The Need for Innovation

## Delays and Cost Overruns And all the risks allocated to tax payers

San Francisco Bay Bridge



Boston's Big Dig



## Public-Private Partnerships (P3s)



What are Public – Private Partnerships (P3s)?

- Procurement mechanism to address issues of public provision model
- P3s: long-term contractual agreement between public and private partners to provide services traditionally done by the governments
  - Bundling of project delivery stages
  - Allocation of some project risks to the private partner
- A wide range of P3 contract types have been used
  - Design-Build
  - Design-Build-Operate-Maintain
  - Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain
  - Lease, etc.



## P3s: Project Arrangement

#### P3s employ complex project arrangements



## Infrastructure Risks – What can be shifted?

#### Political

- Nationalization of project
- Changes in law
- Delays

#### Revenue

- Insufficient income from fares or tolls
- Insufficient income from other operations
- Insufficient traffic

## Capital Expenditures

- Project schedule
- Commodity prices/availability
- Construction cost
- Operations & Maintenance (O&M)
  - Performance risk
  - Operating cost overrun
- Financing
  - Refinancing risks
  - Spread between O&M and revenue growth rates



## Financial Characteristics of P3s

#### Funding Sources —how do you fund the infrastructure?

- Private shareholder equity
- Non-taxable bonds (e.g., municipal bonds, private activity bonds)
- Taxable bonds
- Bank debt (senior and/or subordinate)
- State infrastructure bank loans
- Federal loans (e.g., TIFIA)
- Revenue Sources –how do you recover the investment?
  - Direct User Charges (Tolls, Transit Fares, User Fees)
  - Shadow Tolls
  - Public Subsidies
  - Availability Payments
  - Combination of above



## P3s: Advantages and Disadvantages

## Advantages

- Accelerated delivery and availability to the public
- On-budget, on-time delivery
- Utilization of private financial resources
- Cost saving through innovative practices of the private sector
- Risks are more visible

## Disadvantages

- Substantial transaction costs (e.g., legal, financial and technical consulting service fee, higher interest costs in cases of private debt-financing)
- Complexity requires highly skilled civil servants
- Government labor unions may perceive this as a threat
- Country institution may favor opportunistic behavior from different players



## The U.S. P3 Context



## Government Transportation Funding is Decentralized



Transporation Expenditure by Government Unit, FY1960-FY2010



# A Federal System

## Authority is fragmented

- Coordination is hard to achieve
- Experimentation allows innovations
- Infrastructure authority is centered at the state level

## Example: South Bay Expressway

- The State of California implements the P3 project
- Some Federal agencies oppose the project on environmental grounds
- A group of Local governments bought the asset
- Other states learn and improve the Californian P3 approach



## U.S. Transportation P3 Market – State Enabling Legislation

35 States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico have enabling legislation



## U.S. Transportation P3 Market – Highway Projects



# The U.S. Context Impacts P3 Governance Structure

#### Federal

- Grant and loan programs on infrastructure
- Deductibility of municipal bond interests

## State

- Authority resides here
- Some of the assets are in this level
- Implements some of the transportation P3 projects

## Local

- Some of the assets are in this level
- Implements some of the transportation P3 projects



## Institutional Framework

- TABOR Taxpayer Bill of Rights
  - Limits funding in certain states affecting infrastructure
- Litigation by citizens
  - Important avenue to oppose political and bureaucratic decisions
  - Several projects that have been canceled or nearly canceled: U.S. 460
  - Other have faced serious financial risks: Elizabeth River Crossings
- Bankruptcy Chapter II and Active Capital Market
  - Chapter II: favors the continuation of the business
  - Active capital market: facilitates competition for better concessionaires



United States – P3 Market Characteristics

- The market is growing but it has been slow
  - Competing sources of funds: Tax-exempt bonds, Highway Trust Fund
- Federal system promotes experimentation but hinders coordination across government levels
  - E.g., I-95 HOV/HOT Lanes, Arlington county vs Commonwealth of Virginia
- Federal level promotes P3s in different ways
  - BATIC (July 2016): Project preparation, credit assistance (TIFIA, RRIF, PABs), FASTLANE grants
- Litigation by citizens



## Different Types of P3 Financing Mechanisms



## United States – P3 Trends

Learning curve has improved delivery

- E.g. Presidio Parkway vs. South Bay Expressway. More on-time delivery
- Traditional funding sources drying up; P3s more appealing
  - Debt-limits, opposition to tax hikes
  - Ongoing debate between availability payments vs revenue-risk
- P3 project pipeline expanding beyond transportation
  - E.g., University housing, Social infrastructure
- P3s battling political headwinds
  - VA P3 office absorbed into VDOT; TX P3 office disbanded; CA P3 law expires 2016; FL – cancelled projects



# P3 Center Research: Renegotiation of P3s



## Summary

- 6 case studies of renegotiations were undertaken
  - SR 91 Express Lanes
  - South Bay Expressway
  - Indiana Toll Road
  - Dulles Greenway
  - Pocahontas Parkway
  - Elizabeth River Crossings
- What can be learned from P3 renegotiations in the US?
  - Main explanations for renegotiations in the U.S. P3 highways
    - Exogenous shocks: Great Recession and policy response
    - Contract complexity: novelty, civil rights concerns, risk transfer



# Drivers of Renegotiation

#### Opportunism

Renegotiation occurs **to extract rents**, taking advantage of the incompleteness of the contract

See: Guasch (2004)

#### **Exogenous changes**

Renegotiation occurs **to adapt to unexpected exogenous events** that affect benefits of participants

See: De Brux (2010)

#### **Contract complexity**

Renegotiation occurs **to adapt to unexpected complexities** of the project

See: Saussier et al. (2009)

#### Winner's curse

Renegotiation occurs **to diminish the loses of the bid winner** when it had unrealizable expectations

See: Athias et al. (2009)



# Renegotiation is One of Four Potential Outcomes

#### Renegotiations

Modifications of the conditions of the P3 contractual agreements

#### **Bankruptcy**

Legal status of an entity that cannot repay its debt. The court may approve liquidation or debt relief

#### **Debt default**

Inability to meet debt repayment obligations (interests and/or principal) when due

#### **Buy-out**

SPV is acquired by a new owner with different skills and risk preferences

# Relevance of a Framework for P3 Renegotiations

- Are renegotiations a failure or a success?
  - Is it enough to analyze what was under renegotiation?
  - What do we learn if we also consider alternative outcomes?





# When Renegotiations Are Not An Option

#### Bankruptcy is a real risk

- Private sector is internalizing most of the financial loses
- Bankruptcy costs go to private operators
- And also to creditors (debt reduction and reorganization)
- No government debt-guarantees
- Only in SBX we see government money lost (TIFIA loan)
- However, TIFIA's "spring lien" was useful to protect the public sector

#### Are buy-outs an option?

- There is an active capital market
  - It diminishes the monopoly power of the incumbent private operator
  - It is an alternative to inconvenient renegotiations and bankruptcies



# P3 Center Research: Evidence Project



## How are P3s actually Doing?

#### Empirical evidence – not sufficient

- Are they really saving costs?
- Failures (e.g. bankruptcy) are more visible than successful continuing operation
- Few US P3 concessions have reached maturity
- Comprehensive analysis quite difficult : US P3 market highly fragmented
- Relationships between the states' P3 institutions and their usage of P3s



## **Evaluating P3 Savings**

Value for money (VfM)

How much \$\$ (if any) is saved through P3 versus conventional approach



## Data & Method

- Data collection by contacting DOTs
- I 3 VfM studies identified, 7 were analyzed

Project Name	Public Sponsor	Capital (million) <sup>(1)</sup>	Current Status	
Presidio Parkway Phase 2	California DOT	\$365 x	Under construction	
I-595 Managed Lanes	Florida DOT	\$1,814 x	In operation	
Port of Miami Tunnel	Florida DOT	\$914 x	In operation	
I-4 Ultimate	Florida DOT	\$2,323 x	Under construction	
Brent Spence Bridge	Ohio DOT	<b>\$2,632</b> <sup>(2)</sup>	Procurement TBA	
I-64 Managed Lanes	Virginia DOT	\$2,957 <sup>(2,3)</sup>	Project deferred	
I-85 Renewal Project	Virginia DOT	\$806 <sup>(2)</sup>	Project deferred	



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## Results

#### Models

- Different Public Sector Comparator due to procurement practices
- Usual P3 under analysis: DBFOM + availability payments

#### Discount rate (DR)

- PSC: Similar discount rates despite literature debates on the topic
- > P3: Only one case where risk is recognized

#### P3 Equity Internal Rate of Return (IRR)

Equity IRR for P3 projects in US ranges 11-12% for available payment projects

Project Name	PSC	P3	PSC - DR	P3 - DR	IRR
Presidio Parkway Ph2	DBB	DBFOM+a /DBF	Rf: 5.5%	Rf: 7.5%+risk	11.5%
I-595 Managed Lanes	DBF	DBFOM+a	Nom: 5%	As PSC	11.5%
Port of Miami Tunnel	DBB / DB	DBFOM+a	Nom5%	As PSC	11.33%
I-4 Ultimate	DB	DBFOM+a	Nom: 5%	As PSC	12%
Brent Spence Bridge	DBB+t /DB+t	DBFOM+a /DBFOM+t	Rf: 5%	As PSC	n/a
I-64 Managed Lanes	DBB	DBFOM+a /DBF /DBFOM+t	n/a	n/a	n/a
I-85 Renewal Project	DBB	DBFOM+a	n/a	n/a	n/a



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## Center for Transportation Public-Private Partnership Policy George Mason University



#### "Public Private Partnerships and Infrastructure Finance: Policy and Recent Evidence" For more information:

Visit us at: p3policy.gmu.edu

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